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Abstract
This note establishes a revelation principle in terms of payoff for deterministic mech-
anisms under ex-post constraints: the maximal payoff implementable by a feasible
deterministic mechanism can also be implemented by a feasible deterministic direct
mechanism.
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1 Introduction
In the analysis of mechanism design problems, economic literature often restricts at-
tention to deterministic mechanisms. In applications, stochastic mechanisms are often
deemed problematic as they require that the mechanism designer has access to a credible
randomization device which can be implausible or, alternatively, may be prone to ma-
nipulation. Therefore, the optimal deterministic mechanism is of particular interest. We
establish that in ex-post constrained setups a form of the revelation principle also applies
to the set of deterministic mechanisms.
As shown by, e.g., Strausz (2003), the classical revelation principle (e.g., Myerson, 1979)
does not hold with respect to deterministic mechanisms: there are social choice functions
that can be implemented by deterministic indirect mechanisms but that cannot be im-
plemented by a deterministic direct mechanism in which agents truthfully reveal their
type. This failure is due to the possibility that agents play a mixed-strategy equilib-
rium in the game induced by a deterministic indirect mechanism. In this equilibrium, a
non-deterministic social choice function can be implemented, even though the underlying
mechanism is deterministic. While a stochastic direct mechanism can replicate players’
equilibrium randomization, a deterministic direct mechanism cannot do so by definition.
Strausz (2003) formulates a revelation principle in terms of payoff for the one-agent case
under interim constraints. We show that such a form of the revelation principle also
holds for the multiple-agents case under ex-post constraints: despite the failure of the
revelation principle, it is still without loss of generality to neglect indirect mechanisms if
the objective is to identify a social choice function that
(a) maximizes the expectation of a general payoff function over outcomes (e.g., social
welfare or revenue),
(b) is implementable in dominant strategies, and
(c) satisfies all additional constraints (if there are any) ex-post.1
Any deterministic mechanism that maximizes the designer’s payoff corresponds to a fea-
sible truthful direct deterministic mechanism that is payoff-equivalent for agents and the
designer. Hence, when studying deterministic mechanisms under constraints that have
to be satisfied regardless of the strategy of other players, there is no loss of generality
when restricting attention to direct truthful mechanisms in optimal mechanism design.
Depending on the application, imposing constraints ex-post instead of interim or ex-ante
is more suitable. We use our result in Jarman and Meisner (2016), where a procurer can
only spend a fixed budget, i.e., the budget must suffice for any outcome of the mech-
anism. Alternatively, limited liability or the possibility of default motivate an ex-post
participation constraint. Dominant-strategy implementable mechanisms are popular, as
they are easy to explain and are not prone to manipulation or the misspecification of
beliefs. When considering such mechanisms for the latter reason, it is indeed consistent
not to consider stochastic mechanisms because they require agents (who may believe in
other priors) to believe in the mechanism designers’ randomization distribution.
1There can be additional constraints that are imposed ex-ante or interim, if these constraints are
implied by ex-post constraints.
1
The appeal of both deterministic and dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DIC)
mechanisms has led to many contributions on mechanism equivalence. For any Bayesian
incentive-compatible (BIC) mechanism, Chen, Wei, Li, and Sun (2016) construct an
equivalent deterministic BIC mechanism delivering the same interim outcome.2 Ger-
shkov, Goeree, Kushnir, Moldovanu, and Shi (2013) show that for any feasible BIC mech-
anism there exists a DIC mechanism that yields the same interim expected payoffs. Both
equivalence results do not generalize our result because the equivalent mechanisms can
feature other ex-post outcomes that may violate our ex-post constraints. Moreover, our
constructed direct mechanism is not equivalent to, but payoff-dominates, a corresponding
indirect mechanism.
2 Model
A (mechanism) designer faces a set of N agents. A type profile θ = (θ1, . . . , θN) is drawn
from a finite type space Θ = Θ1 × · · · ×ΘN according to some probability mass function
(pmf) P , and each agent i is privately informed about his type θi.
A social choice function f maps type profiles into distributions over outcomes,
f : Θ → ∆X,
where X is a finite set of outcomes. Let fθ : X → [0, 1] denote the pmf representing the
randomization over outcomes corresponding to f(θ). If fθ is degenerate for all θ ∈ Θ, we
call the corresponding social choice function deterministic. Let Fd and Fs denote the set
of deterministic and stochastic social choice functions, respectively, where Fd ⊂ Fs. The
designer wants to elicit information θ to select a distribution over outcomes maximizing
her expected payoff,






where w(θ, x) denotes her ex-post payoff when type profile θ and outcome x realize. The
following three paragraphs elaborate on her restrictions in doing so.
(I) She can only propose deterministic mechanisms M = (A, g) consisting of a collection
of action spaces A = A1 × · · · × AN and a deterministic outcome function g : A → X
that maps action profiles a = (a1, . . . , aN) ∈ A into outcomes. To ensure the existence
of an equilibrium in the game induced by the mechanism, we only consider mechanisms
with finite action spaces. The set of direct mechanisms consists of all mechanisms such
that A = Θ, i.e., all mechanisms that simply ask the agents to report their type.
(II) A type-θi agent’s ex-post utility from outcome x is denoted by Ui(x, θi). Let a type-
θi agent i’s payoff from playing action ai ∈ Ai against actions a−i ∈ A−i = ×j 6=iAj in
mechanism M be denoted by uMi (ai, a−i, θi) = Ui(g(ai, a−i), θi). While a strategy maps
types into distributions over actions, we denote it by a pmf σi : Θi × Ai → [0, 1] and let
2Essentially, their novel methodology of “mutual purification” replicates a stochastic outcome for one
agent by exploiting the inherent randomness of another agent’s atomless type draw. Despite a restriction
to atomless type distributions, their setting is very general.
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Σi be the space of all such pmfs. Let σ = (σ1, . . . , σN) = (σi, σ−i). A strategy σi is a
(weakly) dominant strategy in the game induced by mechanism M if for all θi ∈ Θi,
∑
bi∈Ai
uMi (bi, a−i, θi)σi(θi, bi) ≥
∑
bi∈Ai




i ∈ Σi, ∀a−i ∈ A−i, (1)
and the inequality holds strictly for at least one opponent action profile a−i.
3 A mecha-




I{g(a)=x}σ(θ, a) ∀θ ∈ Θ, (2)
where σ constitutes an equilibrium in (weakly) dominant strategies in the game induced
by M , i.e., (1) holds for all σi ∈ σ.
(III) Depending on the application, the designer can be restricted further by additional
feasibility constraints, such as individual rationality or budget balance. We say that the
designer faces ex-post constraints if these constraints must be satisfied regardless of the
strategies other agents play. The resulting set of social choice functions that are ex-post
constrained implementable by a (direct or indirect) deterministic mechanism is given by
F∗ ⊂ Fs.
Definition 1. A (potentially stochastic) social choice function f is ex-post DDS-imple-
mentable, f ∈ F∗, if (I) there exists a Deterministic mechanism M that (II) implements
f in Dominant Strategies, while (III) all other (if there are any) constraints are satisfied
ex-post.
Consequently, the designer’s optimization problem is
max
f
Eθ[ω(θ, f)] such that f ∈ F
∗. (3)
3 A revelation principle in terms of payoff
Proposition 1. For any stochastic social choice function f ∈ Fs that is ex-post DDS-
implementable by an indirect mechanism, there exists a deterministic social choice func-
tion f̂ ∈ Fd that
1. is ex-post DDS-implementable, f̂ ∈ F∗, by a direct mechanism, and
2. weakly dominates f state-by-state in terms of the designer’s payoff,
ω(θ, f̂) ≥ ω(θ, f) ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. Suppose f ∈ Fs and f /∈ Fd. Let the deterministic indirect mechanism that DDS-
implements f be denoted by M = (A, g). Given an arbitrary type profile θ, consider a
strategy profile mixing over (pure-strategy) action profiles âθ = (âθ1 , . . . , âθN ) ∈ Âθ ⊆ A.
3Since σi is weakly better against all pure strategies a−i, it is also weakly better against any convex
combination thereof, i.e., against all mixed strategy profiles.
3
Because each agent i plays a dominant strategy, every pure strategy âθi over which he
randomizes must be a weakly dominant strategy, too, and thus
∑
bi∈Ai
uMi (bi, a−i, θi)σi(θi, bi) = u
M
i (âθi , a−i, θi) ∀âθi ∈ Âθi , ∀a−i ∈ A−i.
Otherwise (1) would be violated, as the strategy must be a best response for agent i
regardless of the other agents’ strategies.



























That is, aθ represents the designer’s most preferred pure-strategy profile over which the
mixed strategy randomizes. Following the same argument as above, aθ is an equilibrium
strategy profile in weakly dominant pure strategies for type profile θ in mechanism M .
Similarly, any outcome that can result from f for any type profile θ must be ex-post
feasible. Therefore, g(aθ) is feasible as well.
Define f̂ such that f̂θ(x) = Ig(aθ)=x for any type profile θ for which σ is not degenerate.
By construction, f̂ generates a weakly higher payoff for any type profile,
ω(θ, f̂) = w(θ, g(aθ)) ≥ ω(θ, f) ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Because f̂ is ex-post feasible and deterministic, f̂ ∈ F∗ ∩ Fd, it is DDS-implementable
by a direct mechanism.
Proposition 1 states that for any stochastic ex-post DDS-implementable social choice
function there exists a DDS-implementable deterministic social choice function which
satisfies the same ex-post constraints and gives the designer a weakly larger payoff. The
result can be interpreted as a variation of the revelation principle formulated in terms of
payoff: While not every social choice function that is DDS-implementable by an indirect
mechanism is also DDS-implementable by a direct mechanism, there exists a direct de-
terministic mechanism that yields a weakly larger payoff for the designer. Therefore, the
optimal DDS-implementable social choice function can always be DDS-implemented by
a direct mechanism when all other constraints (if there are any) must hold ex-post. Put
differently, without loss of generality, we can replace (3) with
max
f
Eθ[w(θ, f)] such that f ∈ F
∗ ∩ Fd. (4)
4
Strausz (2003) obtains a similar result for private-value environments with a single agent
under interim constraints. With a single agent, the agent’s best response trivially is a
dominant strategy. Similarly, if the agent’s participation constraint in a deterministic
mechanism holds interim, it also holds ex-post. Strausz (2003) provides an example with
two agents such that his revelation principle in terms of payoff fails: he imposes an interim
participation constraint (individual rationality), and mixing in the indirect mechanism
guarantees the agents their reservation utility.
In contrast, a participation constraint in our setting would have to hold ex post, i.e.,
agents must obtain at least their reservation utility regardless of the other agents’ strate-
gies. Therefore, agents cannot play a mixed strategy that attaches positive weight to
a pure strategy that could, against any possible strategies of the other agents, yield a
payoff that is less than the reservation utility.
4 Conclusion
It is known that the classical revelation principle fails when attention is restricted to de-
terministic mechanisms. We establish that a mechanism designer can restrict attention to
direct mechanisms when all constraints have to be satisfied, regardless of which strategies
the other agents play.
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